Evangeliou Chistos-TΗΕΜΑΤΑ POLITICA: Αποσπάσματα από το βιβλίο

 

Hellenic Love of Liberty

The love of liberty, like a beacon of bright light, shines through the millennial history of Hellenism, more intensely than even the proverbial and passionate Hellenic love of wisdom. In fact, the history of the Hellenes can be seen as a long struggle for freedom. To love freedom so intensely as to be willing to sacrifice even your life to obtain it or defend it, is a trait of only a few heroic human souls.

The historical Hellenes belong in this special category of heroic people. Fighting for freedom has been the fateful mark of their long and glorious history. The heroic uprising of 1821 against the tyrannical Turkish rule is perhaps its most remarkable moment, but there are many more such great moments in the three-millennia-long history of Hellenism.

             In reviewing this history it becomes evident that, from the time of their appearance on the scene of history to the present day, the diachronic Hellenes have been fighting for freedom more persistently than any other recorded historical nation on earth. Most of the time the Hellenes or Greeks were defending their freedom from the attacks of barbarism; and when they lost it temporarily due to internal discord, they struggled heroically to regain and cherish it even more. A glance at their long and glorious history can verify this simple historical truth.

Even if we leave out of consideration at present the pre-historic heroism that one encounters in the Homeric epics, the fact would still remain that the Hellenes of the historic times appeared definitely as determined defenders of freedom. For they were the only people of the known world, who dared to resist and to defeat the superpower of the time, the Persian Empire. They suffered the consequences of their heroic determination and their Hellenic love of liberty.

By the 5^th century BC, the immense Empire of Persia extended from present day Russia to Africa and from India to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. The people of Hellas strategically situated and determined, under the combined leadership of the two greatest Hellenic cities, Athens and Sparta, and inspired by their undying love of liberty, decided to stand up to this giant and to fight heroically for their freedom. These famed Hellenes made the heroic choice, at a critical moment in their history, to either live free or die the glorious death of a free people.

When liberty-loving men make a decision to fight to their death to protect their freedom, they cannot be easily defeated. Even when they lose the battle and die, they gain immortal glory, like Leonidas and his three hundred men, the heroic defenders of Thermopylae. At such moments, the free and fighting human spirit can totally overcome the innate fear of death, and death itself.

But, more often than not, the freedom fighters win the battle and, thus, having saved their freedom, they use it as the foundation to build upon, and become creators of a higher civilization. The Athenians, and the other Hellenes, did just that after the famed victories of Marathon (490BC) and Salamis (480BC) against the Persians. To them the civilized world owes perennial gratitude for such immortal creations as the artistic beauty of the Parthenon, the poetic wisdom of the Sophoclean tragedies, and the philosophic and political wisdom of the Platonic dialogues.

 Thus, the “Glory that was Greece” was born at that specific time, the golden age of classical Hellas. The unexpected Hellenic victories in the prolonged Persian wars certainly succeeded in stopping the advancement of the Asiatic barbarism into Europe, but they did not eliminate the persistent threat of the still powerful and menacing Persian Empire. This was to be accomplished by the most glorious son of Hellas, Alexander the Great, king of Macedonia.

Alexander’s political and military genius was such that it enabled him, in a short time, to unite all the Hellenes (with the notable exception of the proud Spartans, who were used to lead rather than to follow others) on a common Pan-Hellenic goal. He led them victoriously against the Persians, until the Persian Empire was dissolved. Then, although Alexander’s dream of uniting the Hellenes and the Persians in one commonwealth ruled by Hellenic laws proved ephemeral, the spread of Hellenic culture and philosophical reason left its permanent marks all the way to India.

The heirs of Alexander resisted initially the growing power of militant Rome in the West and defended their freedom to the very end. Cleopatra, the last Hellenic Queen of Alexandria in Egypt, is a great example of the Hellenic love of liberty and heroic resistance to the Roman rule. Her death (31BC) marked both the end of armed resistance of the Hellenistic world to Rome, and the beginning of an intelligent offensive which in time succeeded in turning the Roman Empire into a Greco-Roman “condominium” for the next three centuries.

When the Emperor Constantine decided to transfer the seat of the Roman Empire from Rome to New Rome or Constantinople (330AD), the world witnessed the peaceful transformation of the aging Roman Empire into a culturally unified, Hellenized and Christianized Empire known in history as the Byzantine Empire. For more than a millennium (330-1453), this Hellenized Empire stood as the defender of freedom at the extended borders of the Greco-Roman civilization.

Although Constantinople was not like the Hellenic and classical Athens, it became in time a beacon of light in the Dark Ages that had darkened the rest of Europe, West and North. It was recognized even then as the defender of human freedom and dignity against the militant and more fanatic faith of Islam. Led by Arabs initially, Islam expanded rapidly westward, conquered Christian North Africa and Spain, where it remained and ruled over Christians for centuries.

However, in the East, i.e. in the Hellenized Roman Empire, Islam, under successive Arab, Iranian, and Turkish leadership, failed miserably to move into Europe for many centuries (7^th–14^th), in spite of its great efforts. This was due primarily to heroic resistance of the Byzantine Empire, which by that time had been culturally shaped by a blending of Christian faith, Roman law, and Hellenic literature. The Greco-Roman realm had changed into the Greco-Christian realm.

Ironically, it was after greedy and foolish Crusaders had plundered Constantinople (1204) and had divided and weakened the Empire, by trying to impose upon the heroic remnants of Orthodox Christianity a version of Catholic despotism, that the gates of Europe were opened to Turks. With them, Islam entered and stayed for centuries. Muslim Turks settled in South Eastern Europe until the 20^th century, holding in subjugation the Greeks and other Orthodox Christians of the Balkans. It is a great historic irony that the Christian Europeans have now invited the Muslim Turks reluctantly to return to Europe, as potential political partners in the European Union.

In this historical background, then, the date March 25, 1821, is a memorable moment in the history of Hellas/Greece and its fight for freedom. The heroic rising of a whole nation, the Neo-Hellenic nation, that was believed to have been dead for four centuries under the Turkish yoke, appeared as a great historic miracle. For the New Hellenes, like their ancestors in Marathom and Salamis, were ready to utter again the same fateful cry, “Freedom or Death!” They were also prepared to pay the heavy price in blood and sacrifice to regain their long lost political freedom.

The rebirth of Hellas or Greece as a new nation was the political outcome of the heroic struggle for Hellenic freedom. Leonidas and Themistocles, Alexander the Great and Constantine Palaiologos, and the other Hellenic heroes of history would have recognized themselves in the acts of noble men like Diakos, Karaiskakis, Botsaris, Papaflessas, Kanaris, Kolokotronis, and all those who bravely led the Hellenic struggle for freedom and political independence (1821-1830).

Although territorially the free New Hellas was only a tiny fraction of what it had been in Ancient, Alexandrine, and Byzantine times, it was inspired by the same love of liberty and determined to defend its freedom bravely. The crucial test came for it in October 28^th of 1940-41, when Greece was attacked by the combined powers of Fascism and Nazism, but it resisted them both heroically. This act of resisting the aggressors and sacrificing their lives in the altar of Liberty, at a time when the rest of Europe had surrendered to them without fight, is certainly the best birth certificate of the Modern Greeks as legitimate inheritors of the great Hellenic ancestors. The Greek heroic resistance also delayed the Nazi advance, and forced Hitler to alter his plans of invading Russia. Thus, it contributed to the ultimate victory of the Allies, because it gave precious time to Stalin to prepare his resistance and to defeat the invaders, with the help of Russian winter.

At any rate, at the political present the Hellenic, historic characteristic of unconditional love of liberty, and the determination to defend it to the very end manifests itself clearly in the Island of Cyprus. This lovely land of Aphrodite has been partially occupied by the invading Turkish armed forces since 1974, in stark violation of international law and order. Even so, and in spite of international pressure to yield to an unfair settlement, the Government of Cyprus and its heroic people had the courage to say “No” to a UN plan, which would have perpetuated the division and the Turkish occupation of the so-called “Northern Cyprus.”

Certain moves (certainly humiliating for the Hellenic honor) by the Bush Administration may or may not impede the finding of a viable solution to the Cyprus problem, and a legitimate name for FYROM. But, they clearly indicate that the time has come for Greeks in Hellas and the Hellenic Diaspora to stand up and say “No!” Resistance to great powers and love of liberty has its heavy price in sacrifice, of course; but, as the glorious history of Hellas shows, Hellenes have always been ready to pay such noble price repeatedly and, for the most part, successfully.

By being ready to defend the independence of Cyprus and the dignity of their historic name, the Hellenes can show other partners in the EU how to defend their own liberty and dignity by emancipating themselves from the tutelage of the US, aspiring to global, autocratic hegemony.

We must, of course, recognize and honor the role of the United States, as defender of freedom during the World War II, and even during the Cold War that followed it. But, the arbitrary declaration of perpetual war on global terrorism is so elusive and indeterminate that it has the potential to transform in time even the USA from a historical lover of liberty and defender of freedom and democracy to the exact opposite. For, history teaches us that the right use of supreme power is more difficult than the right acquisition of such power by just and lawful means. It is unclear at present whether the US will resist the temptation of such abuse of power.

                At any rate, it is time that the Greek Government, through its diplomatic agencies, finds ways to make it clear to the Bush Administration, that the Hellenes will imitate their ancestors’ struggle against the mighty Persian Empire to defend anew their dignity and liberty. It seems that at present and perhaps more so in the future, when the messy war in Iraq will grow to engulf the entire Middle East and more, US will need Greece as an ally more than Greece needs the US.

               In this light, then, the Bush Administration, re-elected by the substantial vote of the Greek-American Community and its considerable communal contributions, should try to become a little more sensitive in its dealings with the Hellenic Republic, regarding its political interests and national concerns. There are two simple initial steps which the US diplomacy cam and should take, if it wants the Greek, the Hellenic, and Phil-Hellenic cooperation in its present and possibly in its future ventures and adventures in the global world.

  First, it should ask its NATO ally, Turkey, to remove its armed forces from Cyprus immediately, allowing thus the Cypriot Turks to live in peace there, enjoying the rights and liberties of the liberal EU laws as its legitimate members, that is, as Cypriot citizens. Secondly, it should ask FYROM (also a candidate for NATO membership) to behave accordingly, and to try to resolve the name issue with Greece rationally and seriously.

              Taking these reasonable steps in the right direction would be timely and constructively helpful. They may secure Greece, a valuable ally of the US, at a critical time of need for securing peace in the Middle East and stability in the turbulent Balkans. The American and the Greek peoples historically have been political friends for a long time and should remain friends in the future too, as lovers of liberty and defenders of freedom.

Given the present level of anti-Americanism in the areas mentioned, the US does not need more of it, especially if it comes from such a faithful ally and longtime friend, as Greece has been historically. But good friends can remain functional friends only if they do take good mutual care of their friendship. So, the two nations should work together for such a noble goal, inspired by a renewed Hellenic love of liberty.

Alexander’s Great Dream of Ecumenical Hellenism

It is certainly a characteristic of greatness that great historical personalities and their legacies are revived periodically, as the wheel of history and fortune turns and time moves on inexorably. This is especially true in the unique case of Alexander the Great (356-323BC).

Oliver Stone’s recent movie, and the controversy surrounding his pictorial portrayal of the great man, brought Alexander’s legend back to life. Its potential meaning for the terrorized post 9/11 world was scrutinized, as critics focused their criticism on that undying legend again.

Even before the advent of the movie, America’s war on terrorism had reminded the rest of the world that the traditional struggle between West and East or as the West likes to see it, between “Civilization and Barbarity,” has had deep roots in antiquity, in the Persian wars. At any rate, to classical Hellenic eyes and ears, the Persians behaved and sounded like “barbarians.”

By his double success of uniting the Hellenes and defeating the Persians, Alexander had put an end to the prolonged political and cultural conflict between Hellenism and barbarism. He, then, dreamed the great dream of unifying the whole world (Greeks and non-Greeks), to be ruled by just laws, guided by the light of reason and Hellenic philosophy, enriched by the beauty of Hellenic fine arts and the glory of the Hellenic Olympic games.

As Alexander envisioned the unified world, Athenians and Macedonians, Greeks and Persians, Egyptians and Indians, and every other recognizable historic people within the borders of his immense Empire, were to live thereafter in peace and harmony. They would have respect for cultural diversity, but they would live under the common rule of Hellenic law and reason.

That was Alexander’s great political dream. To realize it, he built several Hellenic cities along the way from Pella, his birthplace in Hellenic Macedonia, to Punjab in Northern India, which marked the eastward limit of his amazing reach. The most magnificent of the cities, which bear his glorious name, flourished on the Delta of the Nile, in Northern Egypt, that is, Alexandria.

            This Mediterranean Alexandria by the Nile was destined to function historically as the great melting pot where a cultural trinity, constituted by the spirit of Hellas (or Europe), Egypt (or Africa), and Near East (or Asia) met and fused for the first time in recorded human history. As a result of the felicitous meeting of three diverse cultural traditions, a prolific fertilization of the spirit was accomplished in this Alexandria. There, among other great things, and significantly for future cultural developments of humanity, Platonism was reborn and flourished again.                                                                        

Even earlier, under the enlightened rule of the Egyptian Pharaoh Amasis, identified by Herodotus as  “Phil-Hellene,” the relations of Hellenes and Egyptians were cordial and close, as the threat of Persian aggression moved westwards and came closer to them both. Amasis even went so far as to marry Ladice, a Lady of the Hellenic Cyrene in Northern Africa. But, in 525BC, Egypt was conquered by the Persians and became a province of their Empire. The Greek city-states in Asia Minor had the same fate a generation later, which was a cause of the Persian wars.

The battles of Marathon (490BC), Thermopylae and Salamis saved the political freedom of the Hellenes in the mainland, and raised the hopes of the Egyptians for regaining their own freedom with Hellenic help. Similarly, after 9/11, people hoped that the heroic decision of the American people to resist terrorism would save freedom for Europe and, with some good luck, extend it even to the lands of the Middle East, which have missed it, since the Hellenistic times. Four years later into the Iraq war, things appear different, but that does not alter the original hope.

          But, not to go too far off our theme, let us return to the great son of Hellas, Alexander, son of Philip and King of Macedonia. Three centuries after Amasis, as we said, he succeeded in uniting the Hellenes and in leading them victoriously against the Persians. He dissolved the Persian Empire, liberated the Hellenes of Asia Minor and the Egyptians, who welcomed him as their savior sent by the Gods, even calling him Son of Ammon or Zeus.

            A new world-order was then born from Alexander’s victories, known as the Hellenistic era, to distinguish it historically from the Hellenic or classical era. One of the great political and cultural centers of the Hellenistic era was the city of Alexandria by the Nile with its racial mixture and cultural diversity. Thus, the world was prepared for the birth of Christianity, a cosmopolitan religion that took shape in the cosmopolitan Hellenistic cultural centers, especially in Allexandria.

For it is no accident that authentic Christianity (that is, Greek Orthodox Christianity) with its rich ritual, refined art, mystic spirituality, and sophisticated theology was shaped and matured primarily in Alexandria. There were born also potent heresies, which by challenging the authority of the established Church and its Orthodox Trinitarian Doctrine prepared the way for the coming of the strictly monotheistic and, therefore, even more fanatic religion of Islam in 622AD. 

It is perhaps ironic that, a millennium after the death of Alexander (323BC) and his great dream, the war between West and East (more specifically, between Hellenic and non-Hellenic) was resumed. But this time it was between Christianized Greeks and Islamic Arabs and Persians. The renewed struggle between the sister religions and fanatic faiths went on for a millennium, and it is not over yet. (The Crusades were part of it, and so is the Iraq war, in the eyes of some critics).

To be sure, Greek Orthodox Christianity surrendered to the Turkish version of militant Islam with the final fall of Constantinople (in 1453). For it was unable to resist any longer the sustained attacks of militant Islam, led by Arabs, Persians, and Turks successively since 1204, as a result of the capture of Constantinople by Western Catholic Christians. Similarly, Latin Catholic Christianity surrendered, at least partially, much earlier (7th-8th centuries), when it lost to aggressive Islam North Africa, Sicily, and Spain, which were captured and held by Muslim Arabs.

          In this historical light, the declared war on terror after 9/11can be seen as a renewed phase of this old religious and cultural strife between East and West, intensified now by the economics of precious Gulf oil. Thus, it remains to be seen whether Evangelical (or Crusading) Christianity this time would be more successful or luckier than the Catholic and the Orthodox denominations have historically been, in their sustained struggles against militant Islam. If it is, unexpectedly, successful, then Alexander’s dream of a unified world, under the enlightened rule of American law with freedom and justice for all, may be revived once again. But that is a very unlikely “if.”

           Be that as it may, the fact would remain unaltered and didactic, that militant Islam has historically exercised its “theocratic rule” over Christians and Jews for centuries. Will it, in the future, submit easily (or willingly) to the democratic rule of law of reason (as opposed to Sharia), in order to enjoy the fruits of true freedom? This is the question, but there is no clear answer to it at present. The outcome of the war in Iraq and, possibly, Iran may determine the answer to this question, as well as the fate of freedom in the world for centuries to come.

If so, it would be another of history’s great ironies, since the war in Iraq seemed so silly initially to some simple and sensitive souls in the US, in the EU, and all over the civilized world. But, in all probability, freedom will be the victim of fanaticism once again, until it finds the courage to fight back, and win the right to rule the unified world in peace and prosperity. In this sense, Alexander’s great dream of uniting Europe and Asia is still alive, as is his undying legend.

Fall of Constantinople and the Rise of Renaissance

For the Greek‑speaking world and the renascent Europe of the fourteenth-fifteenth centuries, George Gemistos, better known by his Hellenized name as Pletho (c.1355-1452), was the bridge that linked the past glories of the Byzantine Empire in the East and the humanism of a rising tide of Renaissance in the West. The distinguished Hellenic philosopher had the opportunity to visit Florence (1438-9), as a participant in the last imperial effort to reunite the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches against the common threat, the advancing Ottoman Turks, as the spearhead of an aggressive Islam, a clear threat to Europe and its culture.

Pletho introduced the Platonic philosophy to the Florentine Humanists by publishing his criticism of Aristotle and Averroes, the great and influential Islamic commentator of Aristotle. Pletho also greatly contributed to the revival of Platonism, which was to shape the Renaissance culture, especially after the founding of the Platonic Academy in Florence under the inspired leadership of Marsilio Ficino and with the economic support of the Medici. From Florence the rebirth of Platonism spread rapidly to the rest of Europe illuminating many minds along the way. The light of Renaissance had thus risen from the darkness of Dark Ages.

It should be noted here that Platonism, as a philosophical tradition with distinctive and recognizable characteristics, was shaped about a millennium earlier by the thinking of Plotinus who philosophized in Alexandria and in Rome. The list of his followers includes Porphyry, Iamblichus and Proclus, to mention only three Platonic philosophers of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries, respectively. These active philosophers succeeded in reviving the philosophy of Plato, enriched by many Aristotelian and Stoic elements.

Thus, the new philosophic synthesis was made durable at a critical time, when the Greco-Roman world was threatened externally by barbarians, and internally by religious bigotry. The efforts of the Platonists were guided by the noble goal of defending Hellenism. By this they meant the Hellenic tradition of religious tolerance, philosophical pluralism and freedom, which were attacked by an advancing militant barbarism, in the form of intolerant and fanatic religion. This fanaticism, in their view, threatened to destroy the fiber of the Greco‑Roman world from within more effectively than the external attacks of the Barbarians.

However, these philosophers did not foresee that the fall of Rome would give birth to New Rome or Constantinople, just as the fall of the City of Constantine a millennium later was destined to revive many cities in Italy. For the rebirth and the cultural and economic flourishing of Florence, Venice, Genoa, Milan, Naples, Rome, etc., was directly related to the long and painful fall of Constantinople that literally “enriched” them in more than one way (1204-1453).

Accordingly, it is no accident that Pletho’s effort to revive Platonism, more than a thousand years after Plotinus and Porphyry is strikingly Hellenic and anti‑dogmatic in tone. What is rather surprising is that, unlike Porphyry who had tried to reconcile all forces of Hellenism, including Aristotelianism, against their common enemy, the irrational and fanatical faith of the early Christian Church, Pletho found it necessary to turn his criticism against Aristotle also.

This innovation in the long Platonic tradition may seem puzzling, but the puzzle has an explanation. For, by the fifteenth century and owing to the labors of ardent commentators, like Averroes and Aquinas, Aristotelianism had become ancilla theologiae (handmaiden of theology), while the official theology was then represented by the “revealed” doctrines of the Koran and the Bible, respectively.

This fact may explain Pletho’s allusions to the bad judgment of the Arabs and Latins who, in their eagerness to serve the “revealed dogma,” were ready to believe that Aristotle was in harmony with the Scriptures and, therefore, honored him more than Plato himself. As he saw it, especially the Latins were so effective and persisting in their dogmatism on this particular point that, in Pletho’s view, even notable Greek scholars and clerics, like George Scholarios, the future Patriarch of Constantinople, had been badly misled by them.

Scholarios, as the first Patriarch of Constantinople under Turkish rule, went so far as to commit a truly barbaric and shameful act in Greek history, the burning of Pletho’s book on The Laws. In this great work the philosopher had articulated the reforms which, in his judgment, would transform the dying Byzantine Empire into a vigorous Hellenic State in the Peloponnese, infused with Platonic wisdom. Religious fanaticism can indeed blind even educated Patriarchs!

In Florence, Pletho discussed publicly for the first time the major points on which Aristotle differs from Plato, in his considerate judgment. Thus, by critically presenting his reasonable arguments, which were invariably favorable to Plato, due to the perceived imbalance in favor of Aristotle in the Latin West during the Middle Ages, his critique accomplished at least three important tasks:

(1) It revived the debate about the respective merits of the two greatest Hellenic philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, and their respective philosophical traditions, more than a thousand years after Porphyry had tried to settle the issue; and it did so independently from any religious affiliation, Christian or Muslim. 

(2) It injected the Renaissance movement with a strong dose of Platonism, which to a certain degree determined the development of culture, science, and technology in the West for the next centuries by placing considerable emphasis on mathematics, among other things. But, ironically, it was Ficino’s Christian version of Platonism, not Pletho’s Hellenic version, which prevailed at the end. Hence history has repeated itself in this case, since the same thing had occurred a millennium earlier. At that earlier time, it was Augustine’s Christian version of Platonism and not Porphyry’s Hellenic version of Platonism that  prevailed.                     

(3) It initiated the process of liberating Aristotle from the uncomfortable embrace of Christian and Islamic scholasticism. For it clearly showed that, in spite of their differences as philosophers, Aristotle’s appropriate place was next to Plato, in the sunny sky of Hellas and its philosophical free logos, and far away from the nebulous and dogmatic gnosis, whether it was based on Biblical or Koranic revelations.

It becomes evident, from the careful consideration of Pletho’s arguments in De Differentiis, that his intention was to demolish these scholastic edifices by emphasizing a tendency in Aristotle to argue at times at least, as a philosopher who was really this‑worldly and least interested in religious faith or practice. But, above all, Pletho wanted to make sure that Aristotle is placed in his appropriate place, that is, after or next to Plato, but not above him, and not in any company of religious authorities. In his judgment, Aristotle went astray, any time he deviated widely from the path of Platonism. Although he recommended the reading of Aristotle, whose works are replete with true Platonic doctrines and insights, Pletho thought that the time had come for Platonism itself to flourish once again.

There is no doubt that Pletho’s criticism of Aristotle sounds at times too negative, hyperbolic, minute, and antagonistic. But we should not forget that his polemical purpose was to shake up the Scholastic lethargy that was prevalent in the West at that time. As the revival of Platonic studies both in Mistra and in the Platonic Academy at Florence attests, Pletho’s efforts were fruitful. Something similar can take place in our times, troubled as they are by religious fanaticism and terror, by the synergy of enlightened philanthropy and Platonic philosophy.

Europe and Turkey: Facing the Future

In all probability, December 17, 2004, will become a significant date for the development and possibly the wellbeing of the rapidly expanding European Union. By its decision to set a date for the commencement of accession talks with begging Turkey, the Christian EU made a serious (though tentative) commitment to open its door and its big purse to a Muslim country of more than 70 million people (mostly poor and poorly educated Asians).

After October 3, 2005, if all goes well and according to the EU plan, Turkey will have crossed the Rubicon and will march into Europe once again, to “conquer it” from within. The means, this time, would not be war but its sheer numbers in growth and manpower. From this point of view, the new-year promises to be politically most interesting for EU.

With this commitment, EU diplomats (especially of core states, like France, Germany, England, Spain and Italy) will have to think of creative ways to accommodate the Turks and their special needs, as the newcomers to the EU Club. Or, if need be, to frustrate their aspirations of membership and politically impede “the process” of their final accession.  

In either case, this would be a “headache” for the United Europeans, to worry about. The question closer at home is what Turkey can do in the mid-time (with help from a friendly disposed Greek Government), to make the road towards Europe easier. Alternatively put, what can be done to make it difficult for the EU to say “No” to Turkey at some point in the future under “some pretense,” and thus crash its European dreams? At least five possibilities suggest themselves upon reflection in response to such question.

First Possibility: The Cyprus Problem. Turkey, if it is serious about its EU membership, can easily and radically solve this problem, by recalling its occupation forces from the Island now. It can also recognize immediately and diplomatically the Republic of Cyprus, (not just by extending the customs union treaty to the ten new Member States of the EU). It can, then, legitimately demand from Cyprus and the EU that the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority should be fully respected in accordance with the EU law and practice. From the European point of view, it makes no sense for Turkey to want to start accession talks with the EU, while it continues to occupy part of one Member State. Alternatively, but unwisely and potentially disastrously for its European dreams, Turkey may choose to continue playing the clever game of wait and see (played artfully and for so long by Denktas) to no avail.

Second Possibility: The Aegean Dispute. Turkey can show its good will towards friendly Greece (and its seriousness regarding its European aspirations), by ceasing its quotidian sea and air violations in the Aegean, and removing most of its armed forces from there. Greece, or any other respected member of the EU (to the membership of which Turkey aspires, inconsistently), cannot be treated as an “enemy State”. Turkey can save much needed funds (and do some good in improving its “European image”) by sending its bright students to Greece to study the Classics with Greek students, instead of sending its planes and warships day after day, even as it knocks at the door of EU! This is another of those glaring inconsistencies, which Turkish diplomacy can and should have eliminated.

Third Possibility: First World War Atrocities. Turkey can create a great wealth of good will among the Europeans, by frankly acknowledging that terrible things did take place in Turkey at the end of the World War I (with the death and deportations of millions of innocent Armenians, Greeks, and other Christian and Muslim minorities). As a result of that great tragedy, Turkey itself has paid a high price in terms of economic development and cultural enrichment. But, as they say, honesty is the best policy, especially within the EU.

The fact is that the future of Turkey will be more secure and promising, if it prudently were to invite and welcome back the children (or the grandchildren) of those Christian refuges, who live and prosper in the Diaspora. Some of them may accept the invitation. They could, then, become the best bridge to connect this mostly Asiatic and Muslim country to Christian EU and keep it there in peace and prosperity for another millennium. Without such help from good and willing “Christian Friends,” the road to Europe will be much more difficult for Muslim Turkey. The “Christian Club,” as they like to call the EU, may finally close the door to them at the end of a long (and humiliating) process.

Fourth Possibility: The Halki School. This issue is similar and closely related to the previous one. Turkey has two options here too, the negative and the positive. It may continue the myopic, sophistic, and dishonest behavior towards the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Orthodox Christianity, the historical title of which it refuses to recognize. Now it promises to let the Halki Theological School and other cultural institutes open their doors, and then disrespectfully and dishonestly it forgets its promises. This strange behavior, at the moment when it knocks on the door of civilized Europe in the 21^st century, is utterly absurd and harmful to Turkey’s economic and political interests.

It is surprising that this blunder has escaped the attention of Turkish diplomacy, which is usually sharp and competent. The sincere friends of Turkey would have expected that the Turkish Government, at this point of time, would have decided not only to open the Halki School, but also to renovate it and perhaps expand it. With foresight, they could have turned the opportunity of Halki into a “Center of Byzantine Studies” or a “Center of Comparative Religious Studies.”

This, in turn, would have attracted affluent students from all over Europe and America to come to Turkey to study “Orthodox Christianity” and its relations to Judaism and Islam as well as to Catholicism and Protestantism. These faiths have shaped culturally the Europe, which Turkey wants to join so desperately. There is no better place (historically and/or culturally) than Constantinople for such Religious Studies. They are now in demand in American and European Universities, as younger generations of students want to understand the historical relations between Islam and Christianity better. Such understanding can promote compassion and peaceful coexistence as an antidote to religious fanaticism and terrorism. 

Fifth Possibility: Hellenic Philosophy. Turkey could have done something much more spectacular than showing respect for the Ecumenical Patriarch’s request regarding Halki. Next to the Patriarchal School at Halki (or in another of the beautiful Prince Islands, or even in Assos, Ephesus, Miletus, Halicarnassos), a farseeing Turkish Government could build an International Academy or Center dedicated to the study of Ancient Philosophy.

As is well known Ancient Hellenic Philosophy was born and flourished in blessed Asia Minor for more than a millennium (6^th century BC to 6^th century AD). Such a move, therefore, would be a masterstroke of Turkish diplomacy. For it would show the World that Turkey is really ready to become a member of EU, and lead it to a New Renaissance of classical learning. This would give students (of different religious and ethnic background) the opportunity to study together the treasures of antiquity, especially Hellenic philosophy, for intellectual enlightenment.

Such an Academy could, potentially, become a center of attraction for many students, classicists and philosophers even from Greece and Greek Diaspora. If Turkey is serious, then, regarding its historical place in Europe in the foreseeable future, its accomplished and Byzantine-like diplomacy should seriously consider these diplomatic and humanistic possibilities. It is within its power to accomplish all (or most) of these tasks before October 3, 2005, or shortly thereafter. By showing its good will and sagacity in these sensible ways, the present Turkish Government (or its successor) can prove to the world at large that Turkey belongs to Europe by right. This will make it difficult, if not impossible, for the EU to say “No” to its persistent request for accession.

Acting in this intelligent manner, Turkey would also set a good example and a model for other Islamic countries (in the Middle East, in Northern Africa and beyond) of how to harmonize their acts with international law, and thus exit the vicious circle of religious violence and terror. Turkey can then take its place next to Greece, as cooperative and progressive European States. The possibilities are still there, but will Turkey grasp them? Europeans hope and pray that Athena, Goddess of wisdom, or Allah the Merciful, will enlighten the Turks to do so, as soon as possible.

Turkey in the EU: But Which Turkey?

For the last forty or so years, Turkey had lived with a big dream, the dream of a date, when the EU will consent to start accession talks with it, so that it too could join the EU. That dream became almost a reality in an EU Summit in Brussels on December 17, 2004. There, a date was set for such talks, October 3, 2005, but under certain conditions to be met by then. That made the Turks understandably very happy and exuberant, but displeased some of the EU more nervous members, like France, Austria, Holland, and tiny and partially occupied Cyprus.

The accession process itself may be long, but if the door really opens in October, Turks hope that their dream will come true one day. Turkey will then join the rich club of the EU. What would happen next, after such an ill-matched marriage, is up in the air and anybody’s guess. For Turkey is a vigorous, youthful country of more than 70 million people and fast-growing, while the EU is made up of Christian (or ex-Christian) and secular countries, with aging populations and with death rates higher than their birth rates in many of them.

But Turkey is a complex country, due to historical reasons that have shaped its destiny from the time of Sultan Osman (14^th century) to the time of Mustafa Kemal (20^th century). So, what will be the outcome of this joining of Turkey with the EU, depends to a large degree on the question: Which Turkey will enter a United (and Christian) Europe of the future?

To begin with, a substantial segment of the population of Turkey (from about one fifth to one third of it, depending on who does the counting), seems to identify itself as Kurdish, with its own language and culture. It rebels constantly and demands more autonomy and/or independence from the controlling power. It connects more (and apparently would like to be connected) with the other Kurdish element in Northern Iraq, Iran and Syria than with the Turkish element in Turkey.

Well, then, if Iraq were to fall apart, in spite of the good efforts of the USA to keep it together (at great cost in human lives and money, but without apparent good reason), the Kurdish Iraq will become reasonably and finally independent. In that case, the Kurds in Turkey may be more interested in joining the free Kurds of Iraq than the far away EU, especially if they have to do so as part of a country, with which they do not yet identify. The Kurds are not Turkds.

But even without the Kurdish problem, the question “which Turkey will finally join the EU” is legitimate. For, to leave out of consideration the many ethnic minorities, there are at least two distinct societies and mentalities, which make up Turkey as a national state that emerged at the end of the First World War and its horrors. It may be worthwhile to describe these two “faces of Turkey” for a better understanding of the double Turkish identity and its prospects in the EU.

It is apparent to any visitor of Turkey (who knows the history of the country) that many Turks (they may not be the majority, but a large minority) look, speak, think and behave like “European Gentlemen” in the best meaning of the term. They are intelligent and well educated. They speak fluent English and other languages, (especially German, French, and Greek). They are “truly secular” and cosmopolitan and it is a delight (sweeter than the Turkish delight) to converse with them. They are friendly and hospitable, like Greeks, but more sophisticated and diplomatic than the Greeks. The beloved Greeks may be offended by the saying of such thing openly, but it is unfortunately true and the truth must be told, without fear or passion of any kind.

I will give you a concrete example, which took place recently and shows clearly that the Turks of this kind are in fact better organized and qualified than the Greeks to be recognized as Europeans. In August 2003, The World Congress of Philosophy took place in Istanbul (former Constantinople). It was a successful and well-organized conference, much better than the one organized in Moscow in 1993, and more hospitable than the one organized in Boston in 1998. It should be noted that the WGP meets every five years and it has been meeting for more than a century. However, such World Congress of Philosophy has never met in Greece, the famed birthplace of philosophy! This tells us something about the organizational skills of the Turks.

As if this was not shameful enough for the Greeks in Greece and the Greek Diaspora, Greece also failed miserably in its rather inept attempt to host the next World Congress of Philosophy in Athens. Turkey had already arranged “diplomatically” for the next WCP to go to a friendly State, South Korea. Now, when all this was taking place in cosmopolitan Istanbul, the Greek “diplomacy” was conspicuous absent, while Greeks in Greece and the Hellenic Diaspora were shamefully divided, arguing and watching the match of a pugnacious Archbishop of Athens against the Patriarch of Constantinople. To thinking Greeks, things like this taking place in beloved Greece in the 21^st century, are certainly a source of mental pain and ethnic shame.

The point is that, for this kind of Turks and this part of Turkey (which once upon the time was Hellenic and Christian, and molded its people in a mix of various cultures and races, with Constantinople as its center and the Mediterranean as its background blue), Europe is there. They do not have to join the EU in order to “become Europeans!” But, unfortunately, there is another Turkey, which is very different (in fact, the exact opposite) of the one here described. So, the EU will have to be cautious as to “which Turkey” will finally come in, if it does come in at all.

Will that other Turkey ever be able to feel “European” and join the EU in the spirit o its democratic institutions? Probably, not. Is it worthy of the EU and its Christian history the effort to try to “europanize” this other Turkey, fundamentally Muslim and Asiatic? Probably, yes.

At any rate, the US to which the EU defers on serious matters of policy, has determined long ago that Turkey, like Iraq and unlike Yugoslavia, should be kept together at every cost. The rational of this policy has not been clarified, but it will be tested with the success or failure of the war in Iraq, which is not coming to an end at any time soon.

Turkey is watching from the sideline and waiting for the American failure in Iraq, so that it can move in and pick up the pieces, as it did after the failure of the Crusades. At that time, Turkey took over Constantinople and the remnants of the Byzantine Empire in the Balkans. Now it hopes to engulf perhaps the rest of Europe, with some help from Muslim refuges, who would seek asylum in the hospitable EU to avoid the horrors of the American war on terror. How ironic!  

European Identity in Crisis Again

The expansion of the European Union (by the admission of ten new member states); the introduction of a New Constitution; and the setting of a date for Turkey to start accession talks with the EU (by October 3, 2005), generated much discussion on European identity in 2004. Who are the Europeans, where have they been, where are they going, (or where would they like to be, and even what would they like to be), are all legitimate questions that have exerted the pens of journalists, diplomats, and intellectuals alike all over Europe.

To an outsider (and perhaps more objective observer), it would seem that the most important formative factor, which has shaped fundamentally the European ethos in the last tow millennia, is Christianity, that is, an aggressively proselytizing religion and ideological and cultural force. The fact that the New Constitution does not acknowledge explicitly this historical fact is ironic, and symptomatic of the ideological confusion of the framers of this Constitution.

It has provoked, not surprisingly, the indignant reactions of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, which, on this point, seem more historically aware and honest than the political and secular authorities of EU at present. The same fact also shrouds in ambiguity Europe’s place in the declared war on terrorism, which seems to spring from the same source of militant Islam, that is, Christianity’s sister religion, historical competitor, and equally fanatical faith and foe. The relentless struggle between missionary Christianity and militant Islam has shaped the character of Europe historically and, in all probability, will form its historical future too.

To close the eyes to this fundamental fact is not prudent for the political Europeans at all. It is myopic and pregnant with dangerous pitfalls ahead in terms of possible expansions. For Europe and Christianity in its three main forms (Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox), have been so closely interwoven as to seem impossible to try to separate them now. At this crucial time, the cultural future of humanity will be probably determined by the outcome of the war on terror, (Messianic Christianity vs. Militant Islam). In other words, it seems that the third millennium has opened in the same way as the second millennium had. But will the EU be absent from this war?

Looking back into the European history, it becomes apparent that Europe was shaped culturally by three major tasks of the organized Christian Church. They are: the relatively easy task of Christianizing the decadent Roman Empire (1-4th centuries); the more difficult task of Christianizing the vigorous Barbarians (4-7th centuries); and the most difficult task of resisting the forces of an invading militant Islam (7-17th centuries), in the East and West. Compared to this last task, the successful resistance of Christian Europe to the atheist and revolutionary Marxism, in the twentieth century, was like a picnic. But, in this last struggle, Christian Europe had the capital support of Christian America as well as Islam. They had all join hands and forces to defeat a common enemy, Marxist atheism and they succeeded wonderfully.

But, we should keep in mind that Christianity as a new religion was born in the Middle East and in Egypt, after the Hellenistic Kingdoms there had succumbed to the expanding Roman power eastward. It was nurture by the speculative Hellenic logos and matured culturally within the security provided by borders of the Roman Empire. It identified with the fate of the Empire, especially in the East, for more than a millennium (330-1453). But, for most of that time it faced and fought against Islam losing one battle after the other, till the final collapse in the fateful year 1453, with the capture of Constantinople by the Turks. They still hold on to it, in spite of the efforts of the Christian European Powers to liberate the City at the end of the First World War.

The millennial and bloody conflict between Christian Europe and Asiatic Islam (Arabic, Iranian, and Turkish) is significant and probably instructive of things to come in Europe. Within less than a century from the death of the Prophet (632AD), Orthodox East had lost Egypt and the Middle East, while Catholic West had lost the Latin North Africa and Spain. It pushed the Moslems out of Spain only at the end of the 15^th century, but North Africa remained firmly in Islamic and Arabic hands (and still does so to this day).

However, at the same time (and as if to compensate for this loss in the West), Islam, led by the Ottoman Turks, conquered Byzantine Anatolia and the Balkans and pushed deep into South East Europe, up to the walls of Vienna (1683). Even when the Turkish Empire was forced to retreat and dissolved at the end of the First World War, it kept Constantinople and a foothold in Europe. Now it wishes to become a full member of EU, understandably.

But what will that mean for the “European identity,” as it was historically shaped in its conscious opposition, its serious life and death struggle against militant Islam, and its dogmatic claims to the “revealed truth” and to the title of “chosen people” of the one and only true God? Will the European Union in the near future be able to absorb and assimilate the rapidly increasing 70 million Turks and millions of other Muslim refugees of the war on terrorism? Or will the secularized, rich, aging, and childless Europeans, be overwhelmed by the invaders, who can overtake them “demographically” by the end or by the middle of the 21^st century?

The “European identity” of the future will be shaped by the answer, which the Europeans will give to these difficult questions. It would be easier, if only the Turks under a strong leader, like Mustapha Kemal, could be persuaded that the time has come to make a third conversion. The first conversion was from paganism to Islam; the second from Islam to “secularism” (at least, nominally); the third could be from Islam to a form of European Evangelical Christianity, if not seriously, at least nominally and diplomatically, just as they did with Ataturk’s “secularism.”

In this hypothetical and admittedly strange case, even the Turks would fit well within the expanding EU. They would be welcomed, then, with open arms and deep pockets full of precious euros. Their dream would have come true, finally. The “European identity” will be theirs, and rightfully so. In this regard, the Ecumenical Patriarchate and its Halki School may be their ace, the best “sword” for this and other similar cultural and spiritual battles ahead. But will they see it?

               

The Present Turkish Political Dilemma

There are many signs in the horizon indicating that “secular” Turkey is facing another serious crisis these days. The new crisis is surprising in that it comes in less than a year after the promising date of October 3, 2005. At that time, the European Union generously decided to open official negotiations with Turkey for the ultimate acceptance of this poor, populous, mostly Asiatic and devoutly Islamic country into the prosperous “Christian Club.”

It is doubtful that the general elections, in the fall or summer of 2007, will resolve the present crisis. It is not simply political or economic. Unlike many other crises that Turkey has faced in the past, since the time of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk on the political scene about seventy years ego, the present crisis seems more serious. For it is a profound crisis of orientation, truly an “identity crisis.” For the Turks must face the following dilemma: will they choose to identify themselves with Europe and democracy or with Asia and autocracy? The choice is theirs indeed.

If they choose the European option, the Turks should also start to behave accordingly, that is, like European gentlemen, especially towards other European countries, which are already members of the EU, and nice to them. This would mean that they cannot threaten other members of the EU with war, or violate their air space or territorial waters, causing constant tension and tragic accidents. The Turks should learn the lesson (and the sooner they do so, the better for them) that as potential members of the European Union, they are expected to act rationally and responsibly. Otherwise they may never become fully accepted into the EU, with all the painful implications that such a negative outcome may have for their poor country or their ethnic pride.

Acting rationally and responsibly for Turkey as for European countries would mean, among other things, that if a country has a legitimate claim or a difference with another country, then it appeals to a court of law for a peaceful resolution of the difference. One should not take up arms, nor threaten to resort to use of force, in resolving presumed differences with other members of the EU, membership in which one also desires at the same time, inconsistently and therefore irrationally. For the EU is based on certain legal and moral principles. All its members and potential members must follow these principles responsibly for the Union to continue to exist as a Union and to prosper. A potential member that deliberately acts against such principles cannot expect to be taken seriously or rewarded with membership at the end of the process. It is illogical.

Acting rationally and responsibly for Turkey, as for all potential members in the EU, should also mean that one must learn to honor signatures and keep promises officially, freely, and publicly made. In other words, one must learn to play with the rules of the game, in which one gets involved voluntarily. You do not have to play in this or that ball game, but if you want to, and decide freely to play and win, then you must kick the ball according to the rules of the game, whether of football or soccer. So you do not go about kicking the players of other teams, instead of kicking the ball, with the expectation that you would not be punished for such reprehensible behavior. It would be completely illogical for anyone to expect to be rewarded rather than punished for such bad behavior. Yet, lately, Turkey gives the impression that she is doing exactly that sort of thing.

 For example, respect for rights of religious minorities is a fundamental principle for the EU. All EU members or potential members must follow the sane principle. Each should try to accommodate the possible needs of their respective minorities, or at least not to place obstacles in the free exercise of their religious freedom. In the case of Turkey, this principle is not followed.

As regards the treatment of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, one may clearly see its erratic and illogical behavior. For, although Turkey has promised repeatedly in the past thirty year to allow the reopening of the Halki Theological School, the promise has not been kept under various pretexts. This tactic makes many people wonder about the real goals of the Turkish diplomacy and its seriousness in making their country a trustworthy partner in the EU.

If Turkey were really serious about its European orientation, one would reasonably expect that its shrewd diplomats would see the diplomatic value of the Ecumenical Orthodox Patriachate in helping the country fulfil its European hope. For there is no better strategy for Turkey than the embracing of the Patriarchate, to convince the Europeans of its readiness to commit it-self to behaving in accordance with the democratic values of the EU. Why not open, then, the School of Halki to European and American students, and Hagia Sophia to ecumenical Christian pilgrimage? Just consider how many euros and dollars the openings would bring to Turkey, and how much good will would be generated among the Europeans, who will evaluate periodically Turkey’s progress towards meeting their expectations by honoring its agreements.

Turkey’s historic debt to Orthodox Christianity in general, and especially to Ecumenical Patriarchate, is great. The fact that it managed to penetrate into Europe, and kept the Christian populations of Greece and the Balkans under its yoke for half a millennium, was due less to its military prowess and more to support, which Turkey received from the Greek Orthodox Church and its leaders. Following the calamity of 1204, that great foolishness of the Crusaders to sack the City of Constantine, the Emperor equal to the Apostles, the Hierarchy of the Orthodox Church in Constantinople decided to welcome the Moslem Asiatic invaders, rather than the Catholic Christian crusaders. That decision had tragic consequences for Christian Europe.

In recognition of that great service and with real political insight, Mehmed II, the Conqueror, followed the prudent policy of granting certain privileges to the Orthodox Patriarchate. Thus, the Ottoman Turkish Empire, soon after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, developed into a sort of “condominium.” For just as the Roman Empire was ruled by Roman Emperors and Greek intellectuals for centuries, so was the Ottoman Empire ruled by Turkish Sultans and Greek Orthodox prelates and diplomats. For this reason it was stable and long lasting.

Given these historical facts, therefore, one would expect that present Turkish diplomacy would be eager to utilize them in its bid for membership in the EU. But it does not appear to do so, and this is puzzling to many observers, especially friendly Greeks in Greece and the Diaspora, who try to help Turkey reach its stated goal of becoming a full member of the European Union. Such membership, it is believed, would bring significant benefits to the Turkish people, political, cultural and economical. It will also promote the cause of lasting peace in the turbulent area of Southeast Europe, especially in the Balkans. 

No one would expect the Turks to abandon Islam over night and convert to Christianity in order to become legitimate partners in the Christian European Union. On the other hand, how would one understand the Turkish tactics? While it seems eager to join the EU, it does not allow its Christian communities, especially Orthodox and Ecumenical Patriarchate to which Turkey owes so much, to play their respective and important roles in facilitating and shortening Turkey’s long and painful progress towards the desired EU. This is a first rate paradox.

Somebody in the Turkish Government must provide a reasonable answer at some point before it is too late for Turkey or its European dream. Otherwise the suspicion will grow that perhaps Turkey does not really want to become part of Europe. In that case, its flirtation with the EU would seem as just an expedient trick to give time to Islamic forces in Turkey to take complete control of the country and make it potentially a member of the militant Islamic movement. That would not be good for Turkey in the long term.

But, as history would suggest, that too is an option for Turkey. That is the reason for stating here emphatically that the time has come for Turks to make up their minds finally and to face the true dilemma. What do they really want? Do they want to be in the EU as the newest member at its long tail? Or do they prefer to be outside the European-Christian Club and inside the upcoming third wave of militant Islam, potentially as its leader and set against Europe, “the infidel?” The dilemma is crucial. Turkey must decide soon, for time is running out.

If the Turks choose to take the path of militant Islam, with pretensions to its leadership for the re-establishment of the Khalifate, they should know that this road would not be as easy for them in the 21^st century, as it was in the 14^th century. For they will have to face not only the Shiite Iran with its potential nuclear power, but also the fundamentalist Sunni Arabs with their great zeal for holy jihad or self-immolation. Not many Turks, especially those who have tasted something of the European cultural refinement, would be willing to move in this dreadful direction, unless they are caught up and moved by “the current” of the rising militant Islam.

If Turkey at the end decides to take this option, by playing its Islamic card at the diplomatic level, then hypothetically either of two possible consequences may follow. Turkey may at the end of a struggle succeed in establishing its hegemonic rule over other Moslems in the greater area of the Middle East and Central Asia. But this outcome is highly unlikely, given the present configuration of power in those areas and the internal dynamics of the fundamentalist Islamic movement. It is more likely that such a move of Turkey away from Europe and its political, economic, and cultural benefits will probably divide the country into two camps (to leave aside for now the Kurds who, sooner or later, will find their road to autonomy and freedom). Turkey, then, would probably and naturally be divided into two parts, one smaller and one larger.

The smaller part will be in all probability westward-looking and European-feeling. It will be made up of Jewish, Armenian, Greek and other Christian or ex-Christian peoples, and perhaps of some potential Christians or ex-Secularists, who could ultimately be incorporated in the EU and assimilate. They will be largely the offspring of those Anatolians, Greeks, Armenians, Syrians, etc., who accepted Islam in the 14^th-15^th centuries to avoid enslavement.

The larger part will consist mainly of those who identify with the Islamic religion and its traditions completely. It will be certainly eastward looking and Asiatic-feeling, ready to fight and die for its faith, in the name of Allah the Great. In this fateful way, the dream of Ataturk to move the whole of Turkey into Europe would have come to an inglorious end. Like ex-Yugoslavia or ex-Soviet Union, Turkey will have been dissolved into its natural components at long last.

America needs no Enemies, with Friends like Turkey


The war in Iraq, so far, has cost the lives of more than seventeen hundred American solders, with thousand more wounded, not to mention the billions of dollars spent.[1] This war effort has produced minimal results, so far, a “cleaned” Saddam Hussein, sitting in his prison waiting for trial, and an inefficient Constitutional Committee struggling desperately to meet the August 15 deadline for the New Constitution of Iraq.

It is not surprising, then, that many Americans, even those who supported the Iraq war initially, now seem to have second thought about the wisdom of starting the war and the flimsy grounds, on which such serious decision was based. Clearly, in the minds of thinking Americans, and other friends of America around the world, the “phenomenon” of Saddam sitting in his prison room and watching TV, was not worth the pain of even a single wounded soldier, let alone the lives of many American citizens and friends of America.

Before the war three predictions were circulating, which the war has proven untrue. First, of course, was the over-propagandized “myth” that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction; second, there was the “myth” that the secular regime of Saddam had “official” connections with the religious fanatics of Al Qaida. Third we had the most dangerous “myth” that the terrorist threat to America (and the post 9/11 terrorized world) will diminish, as a result of a forceful intervention in Iraq to overthrow the Saddam regime. All these false predictions and myths have received plenty of political attention and public discussion two and a half years into this war.

But there was another “myth,” which the war in Iraq brought to light, but has not received equal attention in the media. This was the claim that Turkey was America’s “most reliable ally,” within the NATO structure. For more than fifty years, (since Turkey entered the NATO Alliance in the early 1950ies), this “myth” had been cultivated intensively and believed widely by the policy makers in the United States and in Europe.

Having the second largest army in NATO, and being equipped by American weapons, Turkey was considered as the “most-trusted” allied and friend. So much so, that it was tolerated even when it used the NATO weapons for defense to invade and occupy about 40% of Cyprus in 1974, forcing about half of its population out of their homes. No other NATO country (certainly, not Greece) would have done such a terrible deed with complete impunity.

But it was taken for granted that Turkey’s built up of military strength would be at hand in the hour of NATO’s need, (facing then the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and in Central Asia). Especially in the Middle East, apparently because of its strategic location in that volatile part of the world, Turkey’s role as a potent NATO ally was systematically overestimated.

Well, the war in Iraq came to prove that all this was baseless wishful thinking. Turkey was offered billions of American dollars in compensation and as an inducement, but refused to support NATO’s venture into Iraq bargaining hard to the last moment. Since other NATO allies had refused to participate militarily, the Turkish refusal might have seen as “excusable misstep.”

However, Turkey went much further than this, when it refused to allow the NATO army to open a second front in Northern Iraq in the critical moment of the war, spring of 2003. This second refusal by the newly elected Erdogan Government (with Mr. Abdullah Gul acting as Prime Minister then) was rather nasty and unworthy of a friend, let alone an allied friend. It was also very costly to American interests. It was similar, in nastiness and brutality, to the Attila II Plan, which Turkey applied so ruthlessly in August of 1974, and the United States unwisely tolerated. Now it pays the price!

For the well-thought out strategic plan to enter Iraq from the North would have, in all likelihood, shortened the war considerably. It would also have given the opportunity to the American army to capture most of Saddam’s generals and other supporters, who escaped to the North and the West before the allied armies got there. Most importantly, it would have made it much more difficult for the fugitives and the insurgents to save their cash and ammunition, to regroup so quickly and efficiently, and to start their deadly quotidian attacks.

The killings are still going on in Iraq. They have increased the American casualties from less than two hundred in the summer of 2003 to almost two thousand, two years later. Surprisingly, no one (at least not publicly and loudly enough) seems to hold Turkey responsible for the unfolding (and mostly avoidable) tragedy in Iraq. The “most-trusted” NATO ally proved to be the most unreliable in the critical hour of need. For not only it did not help the war effort, it even made it more difficult. Turkey did all these bad things for America in a cold and calculating manner, which should have shocked all concerned Americans. They should have demanded, long ago, radical revisions of the US policy towards this particularly unhelpful ally.   

As if that was not bad enough for the future of Iraq and the fate of the American venture there, the adopted policy of keeping the three diverging parts of Iraq (Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni) united is apparently faulty. It has been proven wrong and costly in American lives and dollars but, ironically, it was adopted apparently to please Turkey, (the “trusty” NATO ally!)

Because Turkey fears that the natural tri-partition of Iraq may lead to an independent Kurdish State in Northern Iraq, it objects to such sensible solution of the problem. So the problem gets more complicated as time is goes on, and attacks on innocents Iraqis and Americans continue. But that is exactly what Turkey wants “diplomatically.” It hopes that, sooner or later, the Americans will be fed up with this bloody bath and pull out of Iraq. This would allow Turkey to imitate Saddam and try to resolve its chronic Kurdish problem, as it resolved the Armenian (and the Asia Minor Greek) problem about a century ago, that is, ruthlessly. But that is not by any stretch of the imagination in the US’s best interest.

America would have been served better and saved thousands of lives (of its brave solders and the lives of innocent Iraqis, blown up every day by the terrorists operating there), if it had adopted a different and more sensible policy. As soon as the Saddam army had dissolved (and it dissolved fast), it should have allowed the liberated Iraq to be divided naturally and peacefully into Kurdish North, Shiite South, and Sunni Center, (squeezed between the other two and kept under tight control). If such policy had in all probability worked well for the US interests and saved many lives, (but Turkey did not like it), too bad for Turkey!

Turkey, of course, might fear that, if the tripartite division had worked well in Iraq, and served the long- term strategic interests there, then possibly something similar could happen to Turkey itself. Because, like Iraq, it too seems naturally divided into three parts, the European or westward looking, the Asiatic or eastward looking, and the Kurdish. These three parts have very little in common, other than “a Turkish identity” forced on them, especially since the end of World War I. The last two parts do not even want to be part of the “European Union,” as the first part wishes. The Kurds in particular want to be part of a united Kurdistan in the near future, while the Asiatic Turks would like to be reconnected with their brethren in Central Asia.

So, hypothetically, with Western Turkey in the European Union; with Eastern Turkey in Central Asia; and with Southern Turkey united with the other Kurds, every one would be happy and the American interests well served in that strategic area of the world. But will the policy makers in the US see these advantages eventually and act accordingly, before more lives of innocent peoples and brave soldiers are lost in vain? Probably not, as long as G. Bush is President. The following three essays will try to address the Bush problem and suggest a drastic solution to it

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[1] That was the number then, two years into the war. Now it has risen to forty seven thousand.

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